Please Note: You are viewing the unstyled version of Subprimelosses. Either your browser does not support CSS (Cascading Style Sheets) or it is disabled. As a result, much of this website will not look the way it was intended, although all of its contents will be accessible to you. For more information, visit our Browser Support page.

Skip to Primary Site Navigation, Secondary Site Navigation, Content


Home > Blog > Archive for the “Interest rate swaps” Category

Archive for the “Interest rate swaps” Category

Morgan Keegan CEO Defends Firm’s Reputation In The Face Of Lawsuits, SEC Investigations

Despite the growing number of investor complaints and intense scrutiny by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over alleged mismanagement of certain bond funds, the CEO of Morgan Keegan & Co. continues to deny claims that the Memphis-based investment firm failed to make investors aware about the risks of various Morgan Keegan investments.   

In a May 19 interview in the Atlanta Business Chronicle, Morgan Keegan CEO John Carson took umbrage with the ongoing round of attacks against Morgan Keegan - attacks that are taking shape in the form of hundreds of arbitration claims and several class-action lawsuits by investors for losses they suffered in a group of Morgan Keegan mutual funds. In addition, the SEC recently put Morgan Keegan on notice that it plans pursue action against the firm for allegedly failing to inform clients about the risks of auction-rate securities. 

According to the Atlanta Business Chronicle article, Carson said in both instance Morgan Keegan was selling securities that had been liquid, but that their market value collapsed due to an unanticipated economic implosion in late 2007 and 2008.

Investors, however, may another opinion on the subject. Between March 31, 2007, and March 31, 2008, investors collectively lost more than $2 billion in a group of RMK bond funds. The losses in the funds were later traced to the underlying investments made by Morgan Keegan, a fact that many investors insist was never conveyed to them. The investments themselves included risky and untested types of subprime mortgage securities, collateral debt obligations (CDOs) and other debt instruments.

Hyperion Brookfield Asset Management now manages the funds.           

Meanwhile, Morgan Keegan is in legal hot water with several rural Tennessee municipalities, which contend the investment firm failed to disclose its business interest in selling bond derivatives. In addition to acting as an advisor and underwriter of the instruments, Morgan Keegan also resided over state-sponsored seminars on interest-rate swaps in which bankers from Morgan Keegan taught representatives from various Tennessee cities and counties about derivative financing

Tennessee securities regulators are investigating the matter.

Carson’s take on the Tennessee situation? According to the Atlanta Business Chronicle, he conceded only that Morgan Keegan was “guilty of political naiveté” and that the firm viewed the educational meetings as a “public service.”

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

Risky Morgan Keegan Derivative Bond Deals Leave Small Towns Reeling

Lewisburg, Tennessee, is a quaint, affable town known for rich farmland and friendly neighbors. Now, thanks to investment bank Morgan Keegan & Company, Lewisburg is becoming known for something else: municipal bond derivative deals gone bad.

The small city’s introduction to Morgan Keegan and the derivative instruments occurred five years ago, when Lewisburg was trying to lower the interest on a bond for a new sewer system. Bob Phillips, Lewisburg’s part-time mayor, approached Morgan Keegan for advice and quickly became immersed in the complex world of derivatives.

As reported April 7 by the New York Times, that world soon soured for Lewisburg an hundreds of small cities just like it. Municipalities that bought derivatives were much like homeowners, securing fixed-rate mortgages and then refinancing with lower interest, variable rate mortgages, says the New York Times article.

In the case of the municipalities, however, many officials now say they were never told or didn’t understand that interest rates on derivatives can go much higher if economic conditions turn sour.

When the inevitable happened and the economy, in fact, worsened, Lewisburg paid the price. The cost of interest paid on its sewer bonds has quadrupled to an astounding $1 million. As for Lewisburg residents, they face a 33% increase in water and sewer rates.

And the added costs couldn’t come at a worst time. Unemployment in Lewisburg currently stands at more than 10%, as a slew of established businesses close their doors. Even longtime employer Sanford Pencil, the Sharpie pen maker, is preparing to relocate to Mexico. 

At the time Lewisburg officials entered into their municipal derivative contract with Morgan Keegan, the Memphis based investment firm dominated nearly the municipal bond derivative business in Tennessee, both in terms of acting as an adviser and as an underwriter. According to the New York Times article, data compiled by Tennessee’s comptroller’s office show Morgan Keegan sold some $2 billion worth of municipal bond derivatives to 38 cities and counties since 2001.

Many of the deals orchestrated by Morgan Keegan have resulted in similar predicaments like happening in Lewisburg. In nearby Claiborne County, Tennessee, for instance, officials there are desperately trying to get out of a municipal bond derivative contract with Morgan Keegan. Doing so, however, will cost the county $3 million, money the county can ill afford.

The same is true in Mount Juliet. Located about 17 miles from downtown Nashville, city leaders recently learned that payments on their bonds had increased by 500% to $478,000, according to the New York Times story.

Meanwhile, as Lewisburg, Mount Juliet and many other Tennessee municipalities struggle to find a way out of their derivative messes, Morgan Keegan is counting the millions and millions of dollars in fees it’s collected by serving in the dual, and questionable, role of underwriter and adviser.

 

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses. 

Interest Rate Swaps Create Financial Nightmare For Hospitals, Tax Exempt Groups

They’ve been called everything from weapons of mass destruction to a company’s worst investment nightmare. Now hospitals and nonprofits from California to Indiana are getting an unwelcome lesson on the financial consequences of what can go wrong when interest rate rate swaps meet an economic downturn.

South County Hospital in Wakefield, Rhode Island is a prime example. As reported March 18 by Bloomberg, in just one year the interest rate on the hospital’s $52 million of debt has doubled to 12%. On top of that, the facility has turned over nearly $13 million in “collateral postings” to Merrill Lynch, money that could have been used to make up for a reduction in state aid for treating uninsured patients or buy four years’ worth of orthopedic supplies, according to the Bloomberg article.

Interest rate swaps have become an increasingly popular mechanism with hospitals, nonprofits and other tax exempt entities to hedge against changes in interest rates. There is a downside, however. The value of the swaps is tied to the contract’s underlying assets, as well as larger trends in the lending markets.

In the case of South County Hospital, fallout from the credit crunch and the collapse of the auction rate securities market caused its interest rate swaps to backfire, which in turn contributed to a $1.5 million operating loss for the hospital and a need to lay off employees and reduce pay for others.

South County is far from alone. Countless other hospitals and nonprofits face a similar plight after having entered into these complex derivative deals with Wall Street. Instead of the savings they were promised by bankers, the instruments have become a big liability.

And the news couldn’t come at a more inappropriate time. According to the Bloomberg article, the investment income that nonprofits use to support their operations fell more than $830 million in the third quarter of 2008, while unemployment rose and more patients without insurance sought medical care.

When South County initially entered into its interest rate swap arrangement with Merrill Lynch, it agreed to pay an annual fixed rate of 3.5% for 30 years after selling $52 million in auction-rate securities. At the time, the average rate for a comparable fixed rate hospital bond was 4.5%, according to Bloomberg data.

In February 2008, however, everything changed for the $330 billion auction-rate securities market. Wall Street banks suddenly stopped serving as buyers of last resort, which led to the market’s collapse. As a result, investors had no buyers for their investments, while issuers like South County faced penalties of double digit interest rates on their auction bonds.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses. 

Interest-Rate Swaps Cost Bethlehem Area School District Dearly

Ill-fated financing arrangements concocted back in 2002 by JPMorgan Chase and other Wall Street banks for a sewer project in Jefferson County, Alabama, are causing havoc once again - this time for school districts in Pennsylvania.

As reported Oct. 17 on Bloomberg.com, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is reviewing records from the Bethlehem Area School District in Pennsylvania over interest-rate swaps that the district entered into with JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley.

As in the case of Jefferson County, Alabama - which continues to teeter on the brink of bankruptcy as a result of the flawed financing deals put together by JP Morgan and others - the SEC inquiry in Pennsylvania is part of a larger investigation concerning at least $8 million in fees that Bethlehem and other school districts paid to various Wall Street banks that sold the interest-rate swaps.

Interest-rate swaps are tied to variable interest rates. The swap itself is much like a bet between the purchaser and a bank: If interest rates remain favorable, the purchaser is the winner. If market conditions create an unfavorable interest rate environment, the bank that sold the swap receives higher payments from the purchaser.

In the case of the Bethlehem Area School District, the bank is now winning. In September, the district’s weekly debt costs increased by $250,000 - nearly $1 million a month.

Just like in Jefferson Country, Alabama, Bethlehem school board members say they failed to fully understand the ramifications of interest-rate swaps at the time they approved the deal with JP Morgan and others. Only now do they realize their mistake, they say, and just how risky and speculative the derivatives market can be.

Unfortunately, hindsight is 20/20. Now, it’s left to taxpayers to pick up the pieces and pay for the error in judgment by school board members of the Bethlehem Area School District. Students, too, are going to be affected by those bad decisions. As debt costs continue to mount for the district, tough choices will need to be made, including cutbacks to educational programs and reduced services in schools.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.