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Wachovia - Investor Insight - Subprime Losses
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Home > Blog > Archive for the “Wachovia” Category

Archive for the “Wachovia” Category

Evergreen Ultra Short Opportunities Latest Casualty in Ultra-Short Bonds

For a number of ultra-short bond funds, the past year has not been pretty. The typical ultra-short fund is off 1.66 percent over 2007, with the year-to-date average dropping nearly 2.2 percent, according to fund tracker Lipper, Inc.

And for a handful of ultra-short bond funds, the situation gets even uglier. Case in point: The Evergreen Ultra Short Opportunities Fund. Crippled under the weight of asset-backed securities tied to the performance of the housing market, the Evergreen Ultra Short Opportunities Fund is off more than 16 percent for the year to date.

An ultra-short bond fund is a mutual fund that invests in fixed-income instruments with very short-term maturities. Like other mutual funds, ultra-short bond funds can invest in a wide and varied range of securities – including corporate debt, government bonds, subprime mortgages, and other asset-backed securities.

The rapid descent of the Evergreen Ultra Short Opportunities Fund has prompted a number of investors to come forth with claims, as well as potential lawsuits, that the fund had been pitched to them as a “safe,” conservative investment - one that would provide higher potential returns than money-market funds with only a marginally higher risk.

It turns out the Evergreen Ultra Short Opportunities Fund owned securities tied to the performance of the housing market. When the housing market began to tank last summer, the Evergreen bond fund plummeted in value.

Meanwhile, investors who were promised better gains at a minimal risk have been left facing devastating losses. For them, the lesson learned is that ultra short does not mean ultra safe.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.Â

Buyers’ and Brokers’ Remorse Grows Over Auction-Rate Securities

Investors who have been financially burned by the frozen state of the auction-rate securities market aren’t the only ones up in arms these days. Apparently, financial advisors are angry, as well, saying they believed auction-rate securities to be safe as cash because that’s exactly how the products were explained to them in company training sessions.

Now, many of these brokers and advisors are scrambling to cover themselves in the event of future lawsuits over the misguided investments, collecting company sales materials and presentations that describe auction-rate securities as safe, 100-percent liquid investment vehicles.

Auction-rate securities are municipal bonds, corporate bonds, or preferred stocks that have interest rates reset through auctions held every seven, 14, 28, or 35 days. In theory, investors typically should be able to liquidate their ARS holdings at face value during the auctions - that is until the market seized up in February 2008 and auction-rate securities became illiquid. Investors who thought they were holding safe investments that they could cash out of at any time learned the opposite to be true.

Understandably fed up, many clients have headed to court, filing individual arbitrations and lawsuits against the brokerage companies and securities firms that they say never fully explained the true risks of auction-rate securities and instead pitched them as “cash equivalents.”

Investor complaints over auction-rate securities have led state regulators from New York to Illinois to Kansas City to even Alaska to step up their inquiries into the auction-rate market and, specifically, into the ways in which Wall Street banks sold auction-rate securities investors.

In March, a nine-state national task force, headed by Bryan Lantagne, director of the Massachusetts Securities Division, was formed to look into the auction-rate problems. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also has launched an inquiry of its own.

An unraveling of the auction-rate market seemed like an impossible concept. For more than two decades, the $330 billion auction market rode a wave of financial success. Then in February, the bottom fell out as bidders failed to show up for auctions. The investment banks that once gave financial support pulled back, and news of auction failures became the fodder of daily headlines.

As a result of the auction failures, issuers of the auction bonds, including municipalities and nonprofits, faced stiff penalties in higher interest rates - sometimes as high as 20 percent. They are now either buying back their bonds or in some cases refinancing.

For retail and brokerage clients, they’ve been presented “alternatives” that include 50 percent margin loan offers against the value of their auction-rate securities holdings.

As the furor over auction-rate securities continues to grow, so too, do the lawsuits. To date, the majority of Wall Street’s major investment banks and brokerage firms, including Citigroup, E-Trade Financial Corp., Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Raymond James Financial, UBS, AG, Wachovia Corp. and Wells Fargo Investments, are the target of investor litigation over failed auction-rate securities.

The outcome of these lawsuits is anyone’s guess. Regardless, an even bigger problem now awaits Wall Street: an unprecedented crisis in confidence with investors. The unspoken bond of trust between broker and client is supposed to be sacred; once broken, it’s difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct. It becomes a situation reminiscent of the age-old children’s nursery rhyme in which, “all the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t put Humpty together again.”

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

Wachovia Faces Auction-Rate Securities Probe

Following the deep freeze of the auction-rate bond market in February, state and federal regulators launched a series of investigations into how investment banks marketed and sold these to investors. Now, it’s Wachovia Corporation’s turn to be in the hot seat.

On May 12, Wachovia, the nation’s fourth-largest bank, confirmed that its securities unit had received subpoenas and inquiries from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and regulators in various states regarding its auction-rate securities practices.

As with other ongoing investigations into auction-rate securities, the issue at hand is how investment banks pitched the securities to investors. A number of investors say they were told auction-rate securities would be a safe, liquid investment, much like money-market accounts but with higher rates of return.

Similar to long-term bonds, auction-rate securities are bought and sold at auctions held every seven, 28 or 35 days. The first signs of distress in the $330 billion auction-rate market unfolded earlier this year, when the investment banks and securities firms began to pull back their support and stopped bidding on the securities. As a result, auctions for the securities failed, leaving non-profit borrowers - such as municipalities, museums and hospitals - with interest payments that more than doubled. As for individual investors, they were left unable to access their once-liquid money.

State and federal regulators now want to know whether the investment banks and securities firms that first sold the securities fully explained the risks of failed auctions to investors. Earlier this year, nine states formed a task force to launch a broader investigation into the troubles affecting the auction-rate securities market. Among those involved: Massachusetts, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington.

Meanwhile, for the thousands of investors who are now caught in the auction-rate vortex, a resolution from these state and federal investigations can’t come soon enough. For them, action needs to happen - and now.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.