Archive for the “Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac” Category

The year of 2008 will likely be remembered as the year subprime mortgages and corporate scandals changed the face of Wall Street. Buried under the weight of the subprime crisis, financial institutions took nearly $800 billion in writedowns and losses. The value of stocks worldwide plummeted by more than $30 trillion. Goliath investment houses like Bear Stearns fell apart. State, municipal and corporate pension funds reported massive losses from investments tied to faulty valuation models and high-risk mortgage-backed securities and their derivative spin-offs, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

Then there’s the near financial collapse of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and American Insurance Group (AIG), which required a financial intervention courtesy of the U.S. government. Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the United States, filed for bankruptcy protection in 2008. Washington Mutual and IndyMac, along with some 20 other banks were forced to close their doors. Government bailouts reached an astronomical $9 trillion. And as a final nod to 2008, investors lost some $50 billion in a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by the former Nasdaq chairman, Bernard (Bernie) Madoff.

For investors, 2008 is the year that went from bad to worse. It began with the collapse of the auction-rate securities market in February and continued with credit default swaps and structured investment products. For the first time since the 1930s, the Dow Jones Industrial Average experienced losses of more than 30%, closing the year at 8,776.39. By comparison, the Dow finished out 2007 at 13,264.82. Bank stocks in particular took a beating in 2008, with Bank of America and Citigroup losing nearly 70% of their value. As for shareholders, they saw about $7 trillion of their wealth wiped out.

In the world of ultra-short bond funds, 2008 provided the lesson that ultra short does not translate to “ultra safe.” A number of supposedly safe and conservative ultra-short funds got into trouble in 2008 by investing in risky mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). When losses in those toxic assets began to skyrocket, investors lined up to pull their money out in droves, sparking a wave of fund redemptions.

As a result, several fund managers were forced to liquidate their funds’ assets. State Street Global Advisors’ SSgA Yield Plus Fund began liquidating in May after the fund fell 19%. It turns out more than 50% of the fund’s assets were tied to mortgage-related securities funds. One month later, the Evergreen Ultra-Short Opportunities Fund liquidated, as well, when its assets plunged more than 20% in value. Finally, there is Charles Schwab’s YieldPlus Fund. Marketed to investors as a safe alternative to cash, the fund suffered the most losses of any ultra-short bond fund in 2008, losing more than 40% of its value.

Investors, meanwhile, are suing all three funds, charging that they investments were represented as conservative “cash alternatives” and similar to money-market funds. Far from safe or conservative, the funds were heavily concentrated in risky mortgage and asset-backed securities. And, in the case of Schwab’s YieldPlus Fund, several investors who have filed lawsuits claim various Schwab executives and fund manager Kimon Daifotis committed “acts of gross misconduct” by encouraging investors to hold on to their YieldPlus shares, while simultaneously dumping millions of YieldPlus shares from the portfolios of Schwab’s other mutual funds.

Capping out 2008, of course, is the Bernie Madoff scandal. The disgraced hedge fund manager was arrested Dec. 11 by federal agents on charges of securities fraud for scamming $50 billion from investors. Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the supposed protector of investors and their investments, apparently turned a blind eye to Madoff’s subterfuge over the years by ignoring red flags that signaled problems with his funds and their “too-good-to-be-true” returns.

For investors, the Madoff affair may well be the final nail in the coffin when it comes to confidence in Wall Street. Already shaken from a year that was punctuated by the subprime crisis and corporate scandals - including the implosion of Bear Stearns, the collapse of the auction rate securities market, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and inept accounting practices by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and other institutions - Wall Street has its work cut out in 2009 as it tries to renew investors’ faith once again.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses. 

After a string of bad bets on high-risk mortgage-backed securities and credit-default swaps, OppenheimerFunds’ Senior Vice President Angelo Manioudakis has left the company. On Manioudakis’ watch, the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund has lost more than 80% of its value this year - the biggest decline of any bond fund tracked by Morningstar, Inc. By comparison, the average junk-bond fund fell 32%.

Manioudakis’ departure may be the least of the issues for OppenheimerFunds, however. OppenheimerFunds owns Tremont Capital Management, an investment-management business that placed hundreds of millions of dollars of investors’ money in funds run by Bernard (Bernie) L. Madoff, who was arrested last week for operating a $50 billion Ponzi hedge fund fraud scheme.

Meanwhile, Jerry Webman will temporarily take over for Manioudakis as head of OppenheimerFunds’ Core Plus team.

Problems for the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund began shortly after Manioudakis and his team took over management responsibilities for the fund in 2006.  The fund’s demise was then hastened by too many derivative bets gone bad and, in particular, something called total-return swaps. As reported Dec. 16 in the Wall Street Journal, total-return swaps are agreements between parties to exchange cash flows in the future based on how a set of securities performs. In the case of the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund, the fund was betting that top-rated commercial mortgage-backed securities would recuperate this year. It was a gamble that failed miserably.

Credit-default swaps (CDS) and mortgage securities tied to financially ailing companies like Washington Mutual and mortgage giant Freddie Mac also became a major source of trouble for the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund. Compounding the fund’s problems were purchases in Lehman bonds between June and September with nearly $30 million in principal value. When Lehman filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Sept. 15, those bonds plummeted in value to $144,000.

Moving forward, other OppenheimerFunds offerings that held the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund could be headed for their own set of financial problems. One of the funds includes the Oppenheimer Conservative Investor Fund, which had 4% in the Champion Income fund through November, according to the Wall Street Journal. Year to date, the Oppenheimer Conservative Investor Fund is down an astonishing 40%, making it one of the worst-performing conservative allocation funds followed by Morningstar.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses. 

At one time, Legg Mason’s William H. Miller was known as the king of mutual fund managers. Then, too many bad investments in low-quality mortgages and in stock of troubled companies like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Bear Stearns uniformly swept away Miller’s title. One of the funds hardest hit from Miller’s management decisions is the Legg Mason Value Trust (LMVTX).

Investors have lost nearly 60% of their money this year in the Legg Mason Value Trust, which is now among the worst-performing in its class for the past one-, three-, five- and 10-year periods, according to Morningstar.

Legg Mason launched the Value Trust fund in 1982, followed by an initial public offering one year later. Last year, the fund had $22 billion under management; today, its assets total $4.3 billion.

Problems for Legg Mason first began to surface three years ago, when the company negotiated a swap of its stock brokerage unit to Citigroup in return for taking on the bank’s money-management operations. Since then, however, the Baltimore-based money manager has been plagued with performance issues. The economic downturn, continuing fears over the credit market, downgrades of its senior debt, investor redemptions and takeover speculation all have wreaked havoc on Legg Mason’s stock, which has lost more than 75% of its market value since the beginning of this year.

By comparison, reinvested returns of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index declined by 40%.

Meanwhile, after three consecutive quarters of losses, Legg Mason announced plans to cut about 8% of its workforce on Dec. 5 in order to lower annual expenses by $120 million.

Looking ahead, more trouble may be in store for Legg Mason. Last month, analysts at Friedman Billings Ramsey downgraded the money manager to a “sell” rating because of fears falling assets could trigger a financing crunch. Moreover, some of Legg Mason’s agreements to shore up poor-performing funds are set to expire soon, which means the company might need to tap its cash in order to buy securities from the funds.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses. 

Top executives of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac faced intense questioning on Dec. 9 by members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform over their role in the collapse of the two mortgage giants. Lawmakers grilled former Fannie Mae CEOs Daniel Mudd and Franklin Raines and former Freddie Mac CEOs Richard Syron and Leland Brendsel on why the companies ignored previous warnings about the potential problems of subprime mortgages and continued to buy up risky subprime and Alt-A loans.

As expected, finger pointing was in full force. During the hearing, Henry Waxman, chairman of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, quizzed Fannie Mae’s former CEO Mudd about a June 2005 document citing the company was at a “strategic crossroads” and could either delve into riskier loans or focus on more secure ones. According to the document, the real “revenue opportunity” was in buying subprime and other alternative mortgages.

The document went on to say that homes were “being utilized … like an ATM.” It also acknowledged that investing in subprime and alternative mortgages would mean “higher credit losses” and “increased exposure to unknown risks.”

Other documents presented during the hearing made it clear that both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac knew what they were doing as they took on added risks. Their own risk managers repeatedly raised concerns about the dangers of investing heavily in the subprime and alternative mortgage market.

In 2004, Freddie Mac’s chief risk officer, David Andrukonis, sent an e-mail to CEO Richard Syron urging the company to stop purchasing loans with no income or asset requirements “as soon as practicable.” The risk officer further warned that mortgage lenders were targeting “borrowers who would have trouble qualifying for a mortgage if their financial position were adequately disclosed” and that the “potential for the perception and the reality of predatory lending with this product is great.”

Syron did not heed any of the recommendations. Instead, he fired Andrukonis.

Questioning of the CEOs and others lasted more than four hours. Besides finger pointing, little was resolved in the end. Rep. Darrell Issa of California offered perhaps the most fitting comment of the day when he chastised the former Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac CEOs with the following comment:

“All four of you seem to be in complete denial that Freddie and Fannie are in any way responsible for this. Your whole excuse for going to risky and unreasonable loans that are defaulting at an incredibly high rate is that everyone is doing it.”

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses. 

It’s a familiar refrain on Wall Street: “too big to fail.” We heard it with Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, American Insurance Group and Lehman Brothers. And each case, the opposite proved to be true. Government rescues in the form of multibillion-dollar bailouts prevented some of those supposed fail-proof businesses from going under. Now Citigroup, once the nation’s largest financial institution, is joining the ranks, as well, after succumbing to more than $65 billion in losses.

The government’s plans to prop up Citigroup were revealed on Sunday, Nov. 23, and include an additional $20 billion of taxpayer money for the bank, along with a guarantee on more than $300 billion of the firm’s most risky assets. In exchange for the guarantee, Citigroup will issue $7 billion in preferred stock to the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

So how did things get so bad for one of the country’s premiere financial services firms? In three words: reckless business bets.

Over the years, Citigroup created a multibillion-dollar business in mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). As profits grew, Citigroup got bolder, taking more and more risks. At the same time, the company employed tricky accounting practices that allowed it to move troubled assets into off-balance-sheet trusts that could then market the debts to other institutions. Once the assets had been moved off Citigroup’s balance sheets, it made it appear the bank was carrying less risk.

Appearances can be deceiving, however, for the simple fact they often mask the truth. To date, Citigroup has suffered four quarters of consecutive multibillion-dollar losses. It still holds $20 billion of mortgage-linked securities on its books, the majority of which have been marked down to between 21 cents and 41 cents on the dollar, according to a Nov. 22 article in the New York Times.

But the worst may be yet to come. Citigroup has another $1.2 trillion that is held “off balance sheet.”  When it begins to move those questionable assets back onto its books, get ready for a whole new firestorm of losses to ignite.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

For thousands of investors in Hong Kong and Singapore - many of them retirees - the name of Lehman Brothers probably wasn’t a topic of daily discussion. That is until now. Because of investments linked to the bankrupt brokerage, investors are seeing their life savings disappear overnight.

The problem investments are two structured finance products called Pinnacle Notes Series 9 and 10, and are part of a Pinnacle Notes Series of credit-linked notes. Series 9 and 10 notes were issued by Pinnacle Performance and arranged by Morgan Stanley Asia.

As of Nov. 14, the two notes were forced into a mandatory redemption because of their connection to toxic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and financially troubled companies like Lehman Brothers Holdings, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.

Now, New York-based Morgan Stanley is giving investors the news they do not want to hear: They can expect to lose their entire original investment in the Pinnacle Notes Series 9 and 10.

Rumors of the eminent collapse of the Pinnacle Notes Series 9 and 10 have been circulating for the past month, fueled in part by the failures of other structured products like DBS High Notes 5. Like the Pinnacle Notes Series 9 and 10, the DBS High Notes also were linked to Lehman Brothers. When Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection on Sept. 15, the notes became essentially worthless.

According to information posted on Morgan Stanley’s Web site, Standard & Poor’s had previously slashed the ratings of the underlying assets in the Pinnacle Series 9 and 10 from AA to CCC-, or junk status.

The two series of the Pinnacle Notes were sold solely in Singapore through five distributors: brokers DMG & Partners, Kim Eng Securities, OCBC Securities and UOB Kay Hian and lender Hong Leong Finance. Pinnacle Performance, the issuer of the Pinnacle Notes Series 9 and 10, is a special purpose company incorporated in the Cayman Islands.

Like many of the stories coming forth from investors burned recently by structured finance products, investors in the Pinnacle Notes Series 9 and 10 say they were unaware of the high-level of risk involved. They put their trust in the financial institutions that sold them the securities. Now, like their investments, that trust is shattered.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

The basic principle of investing relies on it: diversification. In almost every instance, but especially during times of market turmoil, a diversified investment portfolio serves as a prerequisite to help limit risks and mitigate potential losses for investors. Unfortunately for those who have gone the other investing route, the lesson learned can be costly - and one that many investors are now discovering as they face severe financial losses as a result of portfolios overly concentrated in one type of investment.

A prime example is an investor’s whose portfolio is heavy in preferred stocks only. Bought and sold like common stocks, preferred stocks actually are more similar to bonds. Investors who hold preferred shares means the issuing company pays them any dividends before paying common stock shareholders. In the event a company goes bankrupt, preferred shareholders again move to the front of the line and have first rights to claim the liquidation proceeds of a company’s assets.

At the same time, investors with investment portfolios solely concentrated in preferred shares can open themselves up to significant financial risks. If a portfolio includes investments in several asset sectors versus a single one, the chances that all of those sectors will sustain losses simultaneously is relatively slim. On the other hand, the likelihood an investor might encounter financial losses by holding only one type of security or asset class certainly is not hard to fathom.

In addition, many preferred stocks come with their own set of rules and regulations - both of which can translate into more profits or extra risks.

Stories involving investors who have suffered sizeable financial losses because their brokerage firm over-concentrated their accounts with preferred stocks are becoming more and more visible. Case in point: Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. On Sept. 8, when the federal government took control of the two mortgage giants to prevent them from going under, investors who had been sold various series of the companies’ preferred shares as “safe, stable fixed-income investments” were shocked to learn the truth. In the week following the takeover by the government, Fannie Mae’s 8.25% preferred stock dropped to $2.65 from $13.70, while Freddie Mac’s 5.57% preferred stock fell to $1.50 from $9.15.

As of late September, investors holding certain series of preferred shares in Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have seen their investments decline in value by more than 90%. Many of these investors say they were never advised of the risks associated with preferred shares by their brokers. Moreover, some investors were holding preferred shares of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as their sole investment, thus leaving the doors of their portfolios wide open for potential financial disaster.

To make matters worse, some investors believed that because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were considered “quasi-governmental enterprises,” any defaults on their preferred shares in the companies would be covered by Uncle Sam. They came to that conclusion because that’s what they were told by their brokerage firm.

The fact of the matter is that holders of preferred shares in Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are in no way covered or protected by the U.S. federal government. Any financial losses these investors sustain are theirs alone.

There are other examples, as well, documenting what can happen to investors whose portfolios are overly concentrated with preferred shares in a single sector or company - from Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, to the bailout of American International Group Inc. (AIG), to the acquisition of Bears Stearns by JP Morgan Chase at a fire-sale price. As in these and other cases that are coming to light this year, investors who took the advice of their investment bank and bought preferred shares as a “sure bet” and a safe, fixed-income investment are learning an entirely different story as they watch their life savings literally vanish before them.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

Four of the firms at the heart of the nation’s growing financial crisis - Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, American International Group (AIG) and Lehman Brothers - are now the subject of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) for potentially committing acts of fraud. The investigation is addition to a number of other probes being conducted by the F.B.I. in connection with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market.

Few details have been released regarding the F.B.I.’s investigation into Fannie, Freddie, Lehman and AIG, but reportedly the focus is on whether executives at those companies deliberately misled the financial markets about the health of their respective businesses.

Earlier in the month, Lehman’s chief executive officer, Richard Fuld, and AIG CEO Robert Willumstad received notice to testify before the U.S. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee in early October over the events leading up to the bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers and the government bailout of AIG.

Meanwhile, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke remain embroiled in a battle with lawmakers over the government’s $700 billion emergency rescue plan for the nation’s ailing financial system. In the second day of answering questions on Capitol Hill, both men continued to meet resistance to the bail-out plan, which would give the federal government the green light to buy up billions of dollars in subprime-related debt from financial institutions.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

Years of egregious actions on the part of Wall Street - from corporate arrogance, to incompetent accounting principles, to lax regulatory rules and oversight, to blatant criminality - are now taking their toll on the nation’s financial markets, and it’s Main Street paying the ultimate price. With the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, the fall of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the IndyMac Bank failure, and now an $85 billion government bailout for insurance giant American International Group (AIG), investors and consumers alike are growing increasingly concerned about what lies ahead.

And they have good reason. The insanity happening on Wall Street means borrowing just went up in price. Financing a new car, paying for college, starting a business, building a hospital - all are likely to become more challenging in the months, even years, ahead.

Then there’s the psychological effect of Wall Street’s meltdown. As the financial crisis deepens and taxpayer-supported bailouts apparently becoming more commonplace, more investors - already distrustful of Wall Street and whose very existence they deem synonymous with greed and excess - will be prone to jump ship entirely, dumping their stocks, halting contributions to 401Ks and liquating mutual funds and other securities for safer investment vehicles.

Investors’ need to “do something,” anything, in the face of a crisis is warranted. At the same time, the ramifications of letting emotions guide decisions can often lead to even more uncertainty - in this case, for individual investors and the economy at large, say a number of financial experts.

“It’s like planning a road trip to California but then jumping in a car and heading east,” says one UBS broker, who requested anonymity. “Everyone is running to do something - which is understandable given the state of the markets and the 24/7 media coverage on the subject. Clearly, though, the ‘something’ that people need to do should be given much more forethought.”

Surprisingly, it’s not retirees who seem to be panicking, but rather younger 40-somethings, according to this UBS broker. “The older investors have been through this before,” she explains. “They remember the events of the past.”

Cases in point: On Oct. 19, 1987 - otherwise known as “Black Monday” - the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down 22.61% in a single day. On Oct. 26, 1987, it fell 8.04%; Oct. 13, 1989, 6.91%; Sept. 17, 2001, 7.13%.

By comparison, the Dow fell 4.4% on Sept. 16, 2008.

Still, when news that 158-year-old Lehman Brothers, one of the most established and respected investment firms on Wall Street, has filed for bankruptcy or that major money market funds - long considered to the safest of investments – are breaking the buck and falling below $1 a share, it’s almost impossible for investors not to feel powerless.

What’s Next?

Now the question on everyone’s mind is how do we get out of this mess? As reported Sept. 19 in a Wall Street Journal commentary by William Isaac, former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, fixing the current financial crisis obviously will be a long-term process, but nonetheless contingent on a radical facelift for Wall Street.

Isaac contends that the financial problems gripping the country today are a direct result of something called Fair Value Accounting practices. Simply put, Fair Value Accounting means financial institutions that have financial instruments to sell - i.e. mortgage-backed securities - must mark those assets to market. “But what do we do when the already thin market for those assets freezes up and only a handful of transactions occur at extremely depressed prices,?” writes Isaac.

So far, says Isaac, the answer from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the federal government has been to mark the assets to market even though no meaningful market exits.

Indeed, in his speech to the National Black MBA Association on Sept. 19, Bank of America CEO Kenneth Lewis strongly urged federal regulators to radically restructure the operating environment of Wall Street investment banks, instituting more of the oversight, capital requirements and business restrictions that are imposed on commercial banks today.

Short Selling

Another culprit behind the nation’s financial crisis: short selling, an act that until recently, the federal government has been exceedingly lax in regulating.

Short sellers make money when a company’s shares go down in price. They “borrow” shares from brokers and then resell them. When the share price on the stock becomes lower, short sellers give back the shares at the lower price and keep the difference.

While legal, critics of short selling say the method is at least partially to blame for the downfall and financial troubles of several Wall Street mavericks and other banking heavyweights in recent months, including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual and Morgan Stanley.

On Sept. 18, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced that his office would be launching an investigation into the practice of short selling and, specifically, into the activities of short sellers regarding shares of Lehman Brothers and American International Group (AIG).

The SEC is cracking down on short sellers, as well. On Friday, Sept. 19, the regulatory agency issued a temporary ban on short selling in shares of 799 financial institutions. The ban will be in effect until Oct. 2, and could be extended pending market conditions.

Meanwhile, also on Friday morning, Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke unveiled a series of billion-dollar rescue plans aimed at salvaging the nation’s financial markets. Among the initiatives: creating a temporary asset relief program that would remove illiquid mortgage securities from the balance sheets of financial institutions and a federal guarantee on assets in money-market mutual funds whose values fall below $1 a share.

Officials are still working out details of the overall plan, and expect to meet with various members of Congress this weekend.

Keep in mind that Paulson’s plan - while no doubt a much-needed move in light of the current financial crisis - is a taxpayer-funded plan. Its cost doesn’t come cheap. The anticipated price tag: a whopping $1 trillion.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

It survived a stock market crash and the Great Depression, but Lehman Brothers could not triumph over the subprime mortgage problems of the 21st century.

Seconds before midnight on Sunday, Sept. 14, the 158-year-old investment banking firm agreed to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, officially ending a weekend of rumors and speculation on its demise. As employees began arriving for work on Monday morning, many were told not to return the following day.

Lehman Brothers was the nation’s fourth-largest investment bank, and the biggest underwriter of mortgage-backed securities. Its historic collapse is attributed to some $60 billion in toxic real estate holdings, along an inability to raise much-needed capital in recent weeks. In its filing for bankruptcy protection, Lehman reported total debts of $613 billion against total assets of $639 billion.

Lehman’s debt ratings were another key source of its problems. All three rating agencies had warned last week that rating downgrades were likely unless Lehman could come up with a solid restructuring plan or a buyer.

Many people are asking why the U.S. federal government, which intervened in the Bears Stearns case in March to orchestrate its sale to JP Morgan Chase and, more recently, prevented mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mae from going under, failed to save Lehman Brothers. Reportedly, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson was unwilling to use taxpayer money once again to resolve a Wall Street banking crisis.

For the time being, only Lehman’s parent company, Lehman Brothers Holdings, will seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The filing does not include any of Lehman’s subsidiaries or investment banking and asset management operations. Those units will continue to operate as usual for now. Analysts say Lehman is likely to either find a buyer - or buyers - for those business segments or unwind them gradually.

In addition, Wall Street’s major banks have created a $70 billion fund to ease the effects on the financial markets from the Lehman bankruptcy. Among the firms participating: Citigroup, Barclays, UBS, Bank of America, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley.

By 9:30 a.m. on Monday, Sept. 15, Lehman’s shares had fallen more than 90%, from $3.65 last Friday to just 29 cents. It was only six days ago that Lehman’s CEO Richard Fuld said the investment firm was poised for a comeback and that it had ample capital and liquidity.

Our affiliation of securities lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.