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Auction Rate Securities - Investor Insight - Subprime Losses
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Home > Blog > Archive for the “Auction Rate Securities” Category

Archive for the “Auction Rate Securities” Category

Auction Rate Securities Take Center Stage In Roche Vs. Credit Suisse Lawsuit

Auction rate securities are at the center of a recently filed lawsuit by Roche Holding AG against Credit Suisse. Roche claims the investment bank sold it more than $545 million in auction rate securities - risky instruments that were contrary to the safe investments the pharmaceutical maker says it had been promised. Named in the lawsuit are Eric Butler and Julian Tzolov - the two former Credit Suisse traders who were arrested last year on allegations they invested clients’ money in stable funds when in truth the duo bought more than $1 billion worth of auction rate securities, collateralized debt obligations and other risky debt.

Prosecutors in the case allege that from November 2004 to September 2007 Butler and Tzolov tried to obtain higher sales commissions by  selling auction rate securities (ARS) backed by risky subprime mortgages to Credit Suisse clients who initially requested ARS backed by government-guaranteed student loans. The clients lost their money when the ARS market crashed in February 2008.

Credit Suisse lost a similar case earlier this year against semi-conductor maker ST Microelectronics. On Feb. 12, 2009, a FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) panel ordered Credit Suisse to pay ST Microelectronics $406 million in connection to sales of unauthorized auction rate securities.

The Roche lawsuit was first reported in the French-language newspaper Le Temps.

The case is Roche International LTD versus Credit Suisse Group AG (Case No: 1:2009cv08674).

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their auction rate securities. Tell us about your situation by leaving a message in the comment box or the Contact Us form.

Institutional, Retail Auction Rate Securities Investors Still At Odds With Wall Street

The collapse of the auction rate securities market in February 2008 left millions of retail and institutional investors stuck with an investment that no one wanted to buy. Nearly a year later, little has changed for many ARS investors.

Many investors were under the impression auction-rate securities were safe, low-risk investments - financial products similar to a money market fund yet with a slightly higher return. At the same time, auction rate securities were supposed to be easy to sell - for their face value - at weekly or monthly auctions.

That didn’t happen, of course. Instead, the ARS market came to a standstill in 2008, and investors got stuck with securities that today pay extremely low yields. In some cases, the auction-rate securities will never mature, leaving ARS holders with the prospect of never getting their money back unless they part with their investments for rock-bottom prices.

As reported Oct. 11 by the New York Times, the biggest losers in the auction-rate securities debacle are institutional investors - corporations that bought the securities and were never covered by the settlements that many Wall Street firms made earlier this year to reimburse individual investors.

To a lesser extent, some retail investors are still stuck with their securities, either because their brokerage firm refused to settle or because they’ve moved from one firm to another and neither is willing to buy back the securities.

According to the New York Times article, some corporate ARS purchasers are in a Catch 22 position. They can’t sue the brokerages that misrepresented the auction-rate investments as safe and secure investments because of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act law - a law that was strongly backed by corporate America as a way to curb frivolous lawsuits.

Specifically the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act dictates that when a case is filed it must be very detailed about the alleged fraud or it will be immediately dismissed. In many cases, though, a plaintiff needs access to inside information to make a claim with such information, which could be found in company files. Oftentimes, however, a plaintiff has no way to access such details before the case is thrown out, says the New York Times.

The latest reversal for investors came late last month when a federal judge dismissed a case filed against Raymond James, a brokerage firm that underwrote and sold auction-rate securities. In that case, a customer claimed that a broker at Raymond James misled her about the safety of auction-rate securities. As an underwriter and conductor of the auctions for the securities, the customer alleged that Raymond James was involved in a fraud to unload the securities before the market for them collapsed in February 2008.

The judge in the case says that’s not enough. The broker, he states, worked for one Raymond James company; the underwriting was done by a different Raymond James firm. “There is no evidence in the complaint,” the judge wrote, “from which the court can infer that the Raymond James entities had even the most basic understanding of the others’ business.”

To many, such reasoning sounds a little like a pitch to disguise the obvious. If the plaintiff could prove that one Raymond James subsidiary lied about the securities while another one profited from selling them the end result would likely prove the investor’s allegations of fraud. Yet, if there is no discovery of evidence allowed, we will never know whether such a claim could be proved.

The plaintiff in the case has until Oct. 16 to file an amended complaint that can pass muster under the 1995 law. The lawyer representing the investor says a new complaint will indeed be filed.

Tell us about your situation with auction rate securities by leaving a message in the Comment Box below or via the Contact Us form. We want to counsel you on your legal options.

Losses In Auction-Rate Securities Prompt Lawsuit By Former Securities Lawyer

A retired securities attorney is suing Nuveen Investments, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, and Mesirow Financial for the $2 million in losses that he and his wife suffered as a result of investing in auction-rate securities. According to the lawsuit, Joan and Howard Kastel allege that they are victims of a “fraudulent scheme” in which markets for the instruments were intentionally manipulated. 

The lawsuit says that in August and September 2007 Mesirow Financial purchased 88 shares of auction-rate preferred securities for the Kastels’ account. The shares, which cost $25,000 per share, were issued by three Nuveen North Carolina funds through Nuveen Investments LLC, the Chicago-based broker-dealer, at auctions conducted by Deutsche Bank. As reported in an Aug. 26 article by Investment News, Merrill Lynch and Citigroup participated in the auction, as well.

When the $330 billion auction-rate securities market suddenly froze up in February 2008, the Kastels’ were unable to access their cash. According to their lawsuit, they are now stuck with 85 shares of Nuveen North Carolina ARPS, which pay “unconscionably inadequate” interest that “does not fairly compensate” the couple.

The Kastels are suing Mesirow, Nuveen and Merrill Lynch for approximately $6 million. In addition, they are seeking compensation for emotional distress. 

Prior to the collapse of the ARS market, thousands of retail and institutional investors purchased auction-rate securities on the premise they were cash equivalents. When the market crashed last year, however, they discovered that their liquid investments had become essentially worthless. On the heels of lawsuits by state and federal regulators, some Wall Street banks and investment firms eventually agreed to buy back billions of dollars worth of the securities from retail investors, while other firms have continued to resist such measures.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

Secondary Market Firms Serve As Last Ditch Chance For Many ARS Investors

They were supposed to be cash-like investments, something that would mimic money-market funds. Getting into auction rate securities was the easy part; it’s the getting out that has proven to be a financial nightmare for individual and institutional investors. When the ARS market collapsed in February 2008, investments in auction rate securities suddenly became illiquid, making it next to impossible for investors to sell their instruments.

Now, business for secondary market firms is booming, as more investors still stuck with untradeable investments in auction-rate securities seek out their services as a last-ditch alternative. One of those companies is SecondMarket. As reported Aug. 22 by the Wall Street Journal, companies like SecondMarket are thriving because other firms that initially arranged sales of auction-rate securities and other illiquid assets have not come up with a liquidity solution for investors. SecondMarket arranged $750 million in sales of illiquid assets in the first half of 2009, equaling its sales volume for all of last year.

Secondary market firms match investors with a roster of buyers who are eager to purchase illiquid assets at bargain-basement prices. Holders of the investments receive anywhere from a few cents on the dollar to 90 cents for the best securities.

The deals arranged by secondary market firms like SecondMarket do not come cheap. SecondMarket charges from 2% to 4% of the sales price.

SecondMarket primarily caters to individual investors, and about half of its business is in auction rate securities. Competitor firms like Hedgebay Trading Corp. market their services to large institutional clients.

One investor who turned to SecondMarket was Seymour Lowell, who’d been stuck in auction rate securities from Nuveen Investments since 2008. Nuveen wouldn’t buy back Lowell’s securities, so SecondMarket found him a buyer - at 13% less than the $1.7 million he had paid.

To date, Nuveen has redeemed 38% of its auction rate securities’ face value, with no redemption plans announced for the remaining amount. With no solution in sight, investors like Lowell are more than willing to take significant financial haircuts via firms like SecondMarket.

“My redemptions from Nuveen were really slow, and I’d be dead before I saw it all,” Lowell said in the Wall Street Journal article.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

New York AG May Sue Charles Schwab over Auction Rate Securities

The auction rate securities mess is heating up for Charles Schwab. New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo is expected to soon file a lawsuit against San Francisco-based Schwab over issues related to the company’s marketing and sales of auction rate securities (ARS) to retail and institutional investors. Cuomo announced last month that he intended to take legal action against the brokerage unless it agreed to an ARS settlement and a buy-program to repurchase the auction rate securities from clients.

Since no deal has materialized, Cuomo will likely proceed with a civil fraud lawsuit against Schwab, according to an Aug. 17 story in the Wall Street Journal. As part of the lawsuit, Cuomo will present transcripts of recorded conversations between Schwab brokers and its clients, revealing how the auction rate securities were misrepresented by Schwab.

In one exchange between a Schwab broker and a client, the customer says: “You know, I’m not trying to make a ton of money. I just want to play it safe.” The broker responds: “The hardest part of this auction is getting into it. That is the tough part. Getting out is easy as just selling.”

Auction rate securities are considered long-term debt instruments that act as a short-term investment because of the manner in which they are resold. Interest rates on the products are reset at weekly or monthly auctions. When the market for auction rate securities collapsed in February 2008, thousands of retail and institutional investors became stuck with an illiquid investment.

Faced with potential lawsuits from state and federal securities regulators, a number of Wall Street firms that underwrote auction rate securities, including Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, UBS and J.P. Morgan Chase, agreed to buy back more than $60 billion of the instruments from customers.

Several retail brokerages, however, opted not to participate in the buy-back programs. Specifically, some “distributors” of auction rate securities continue to leave their clients with no solution to the financial losses they’ve suffered because of ARS investments.

When the market for auction-rate securities collapsed last year, Schwab’s clients were stuck with $789 million of the securities.

Schwab’s hold-out to avoid any type of settlement with regulators comes on the heels of recent agreements by two retail brokers to buy back millions of dollars in auction rate securities from clients. In July, Fidelity Investments and TD Ameritrade both agreed to repurchase $756 million of the securities from customers.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

Auction-Rate Securities Mess Rages On For Retail, Institutional Clients Of Raymond James Financial

For more than a year now, retail and institutional investors of Raymond James Financial have patiently been waiting for an end to the nightmare known as auction-rate securities (ARS). The problems began in February 2008 when the once $330 billion ARS market abruptly came to a standstill, leaving investors who thought their money was as liquid as cash in dire financial straits. 

As reported Aug. 1 in the New York Times, the auction-rate securities mess hit individual investors especially hard, prompting investigations by state and federal regulators. The outcome of those investigations resulted in charges that many Wall Street firms aggressively marketed and sold auction-rate securities as liquid, cash investments, while failing to tell investors about the considerable risks associated with the instruments and the ARS market.

Since then, a number of major investment firms and brokerages agreed to settle charges by regulators and buy back ARS holdings from retail clients. Some firms, however, remained on the sidelines, refusing to make their clients whole by either redeeming their ARS investments or paying to recoup investors’ losses. One of those firms is Raymond James Financial.

Raymond James Financial is one of the nation’s last independent investment banks and brokerage firms. Last week, the company reported that its clients currently held about $800 million of illiquid auction-rate securities, down from $1 billion earlier this year, according to the New York Times.

The decline is tied to a series of redemptions by issuers of the securities, including closed-end funds and municipalities. So far, Raymond James has shown no interest in redeeming customers’ holdings, according to the New York Times story.

Redeeming the $800 million of auction-rate securities would be difficult, says Raymond James. The figure is equal to 4.4% of the company’s total assets and 42% of its shareholder equity.

That means Raymond James’ clients are no better off today than in February 2008, when the market for auction-rate securities collapsed.

The picture is much rosier for Raymond James’s CEO Thomas James. Last year, his company raised its dividend 10%. For James, who owns 12.2% of Raymond James Financial shares outstanding, the dividend increase translated into a payout of about $6 million. And the money will keep coming to James in 2009 if the company continues to pay the current rate of 44 cents a share.

On top of that financial bonanza, James saw a pay package valued at $3.55 million in 2008.

Besides executive compensation, Raymond James Financial spent $6.3 million during 2008 and 2009 for the naming rights to the stadium where the Tampa Bay Buccaneers play. That move alone begs the question: Why aren’t the clients of Raymond James viewed as valuable to the company as a corporate branding campaign?

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

SEC Says Morgan Keegan Defrauded Thousands Of Auction-Rate Securities Investors

Morgan Keegan & Company has officially been charged by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of misleading thousands of retail and institutional investors about the liquidity risks of auction-rate securities (ARS). The SEC, which announced the charges against the Memphis brokerage on July 21, is seeking a court order requiring Morgan Keegan to repurchase the illiquid instruments from customers. 

According to the SEC’s complaint, Morgan Keegan misrepresented auction-rate securities as a low-risk alternative to cash - an investment that could easily be redeemed if investors needed immediate access to their money.

Between Nov. 1, 2007, and March 20, 2008, Morgan Keegan sold approximately $925 million of auction-rate securities to clients. At the same time, the SEC contends Morgan Keegan failed to inform its customers about the increasing liquidity risks of the instruments, even after the firm decided to stop supporting the ARS market in February 2008. 

“Morgan Keegan was clearly aware that the ARS market was deteriorating, but it went so far as to actually accelerate its ARS sales even after other firms’ ARS auctions began to fail,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “As we’ve done in our enforcement actions against other firms, the SEC is firmly committed to restoring liquidity to Morgan Keegan customers who purchased ARS.” 

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses

Former Lehman Clients Sue Over Failed Auction-Rate Securities

Two institutional investors are suing Lehman Brothers Holdings, charging the bank of misleading them about the risks of auction-rate securities. The investors, Western Digital Corporation and Ceradyne Inc., are suing Lehman for more than $190 million.

According to the lawsuits, Western Digital and Ceradyne say they suffered devastating financial losses as a result of Lehman’s alleged deception concerning auction-rate securities, which were supposedly liquid financial instruments. The companies contend that Lehman knew, but failed to inform them, that the securities were “not supported by a broad, fully-functioning market.”

Western Digital and Ceradyne are in the same situation as many institutional ARS investors. When the market for auction-rate securities collapsed in February 2008, the products suddenly became illiquid, leaving corporate and retail investors unable to sell their investments at auctions.

Later that same year, a number of Wall Street investment firms and banks agreed to settle charges by state and federal regulators over sales practices of auction-rate securities and bought back millions of dollars worth of the securities from retail investors and small businesses. Larger institutional investors, however, were for the most part left out of the settlement offers. Today, many are still forced to hold onto their toxic instruments.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

The Promise And Pitfalls Of Securitization

Securitization entered the financial mainstream 40 years ago, when mortgage lenders discovered there were big profits to be made by selling their home mortgages to Wall Street. Investment banks bought the mortgages in droves, converting them into securities and selling them to retail and institutional investors, pension funds, foundations and others.

The problem was the securitization market had little oversight and regulation. Disclosures and transparency were essentially non-existent, meaning lenders could unload almost any type of mortgage, including risky subprime mortgages. Meanwhile, Wall Street began to securitize other types of speculative debt, such as collateral debt obligations, auction-rate securities, credit derivatives and total return swaps.

The boom days of securitization came to a screeching halt in the summer of 2007, with the collapse of the mortgage market. As reported in a July 6 story by NPR, many believe the housing meltdown and the recession that followed would never have happened if the securitization market had been better regulated.

The Obama administration is now considering a major overhaul of the securitization market. Among the proposals on table: Requiring securitizers to hold on to a piece of whatever financial product they’re trying to sell to investors. In doing so, investment banks and other securitizers would assume some of the risk of their products and therefore might take more precautions - and much needed oversight - of those investments.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.

Institutional Investors Fall Through ARS Settlement Cracks

Thousands of institutional investors that bought auction-rate securities on the premise they were cash equivalents are still waiting for their liquidity to materialize. By and large, corporate investors were not included in the settlement agreements that took place last summer when Wall Street banks and investment firms agreed to buy back billions of dollars worth of auction-rate securities from retail investors and small businesses as a way to settle state and federal charges alleging misrepresentation of the instruments. Instead, institutional investors continue to be left waiting in the wings, with no ARS solution in sight.

Auction-rate securities are long-term bonds or preferred stocks that pay interest or dividends at rates determined through auctions held every seven, 14 or 28 days. In February 2008, the market for auction-rate securities essentially collapsed, leaving both retail and institutional investors holding a supposedly liquid investment now considered worthless. 

Approximately $330 billion of auction-rate securities were outstanding when the auctions began collapsing in February. About $160 billion of auction rates remain outstanding following the settlements, according to a May 24, 2009, article in Investment News, with most paying very low “penalty” rates under the terms of the failed auctions.

The ARS buyback programs that were announced by brokerage firms in August 2008 failed to provide liquidity relief to institutional investors, offering instead only vague commitments to work with corporate investors on finding a solution for their ARS holdings. Even then, it could be years before institutional investors see any of their auction-rate securities redeemed for cash. 

Meanwhile, companies such as Citigroup, Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, and UBS Financial Services all face a growing list of individual lawsuits from institutional investors that have massive amounts of money still tied up in illiquid auction-rate bonds. To date, several investors have scored major legal victories in their ARS cases, including a February 2009 decision by a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration panel that awarded European chipmaker STMicroelectronics $406 million over a dispute with Swiss bank Credit Suisse Group and the unauthorized purchase of auction-rate securities.

Our affiliation of lawyers is actively involved in advising individual and institutional investors in evaluating their legal options when confronted with subprime and other mortgage-related investment losses.